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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
in the interest of C.Y., 
W.C.Y., D.J.Y., A.Y., 
Respondent, 
vs. 
WILLIAM G. YATES, 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §§78-2a-3(2)(b) and 78-3a-51(l). This is an 
appeal of a final judgment terminating Appellant's parental 
rights to his four minor children by the Second District Juvenil 
Court, Honorable Sharon P. McCully, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court err by materially relying upon other 
legal proceedings when the file in that case was not formally 
introduced into evidence? By materially relying upon facts not 
in evidence, did the court deny the father his right to due 
process of law? Does the competent evidence introduced at trial 
clearly preponderate against the findings of the court? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, REGULATIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIOI 
Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-48(1); the Ninth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution; Article I, Sectioi 
7 of the Constitution of Utah (See Addendum for full text). 
* 
* 
* 
* Case No. 860293-CA 
* Priority #7 
* 
* 
STATEMENT OF FACTtS 
The father, William G. Yates, has four children from his 
marriage to Mary Ellen Yates, all four of whom are the subjects 
of this action. At the time of trial, the father had not lived 
in the family home since March 14, 1984, when the Second District 
Juvenile Court entered an Order restraining him from residing 
with his children. Record at 474. 
Following a hearing on a neglect/dependency petition, Second 
District Juvenile Court entered an Order on January 28, 1985, 
finding that father's four minor children had been neglected by 
their parents and placing the children in the guardianship of the 
Division of Family Services. Memorandum Decision at 1. Specifi-
child had been subjected 
and that the father contin-
cally, the Court found that the oldest 
to acts of sexual abuse by the father 
ued to deny that any such abuse had occurred. Memorandum Decision 
at 1-2. The Court further found that ajll of the children suffered 
from significant emotional problems attributable to a lack of 
emotional stability and parenting abiljity of the parents. Memo-
randum Decision at 2. 
A Petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother 
and the father to their four children was filed by the Division 
of Family Services on August 14, 1985. i Memorandum Decision at 1. 
The Petition came before the Court for| 
25, 1985, and January 13, 14, 15, 19861. 
The Court entered its Memorandum pecision terminating the 
father's parental rights based on unfitness on August 19, 1986. 
The father's attorneys withdrew as couj 
trial on October 23, 24, 
r s e l on September 4 , 1986 . 
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The father, confined to the Utah State Prison on an unrelated 
matter, prepared and tendered to the prison officials a Motion 
for Appointment of Counsel, Pro Se, on September 18, 1986. The 
Motion was received and filed with the Court on September 23, 
1986. The Court denied the fatherTs Motion on September 29, 
1986. The father prepared a second Motion for Appointment of 
Counsel, Pro Se, dated October 3, 1986, which stated, "I wish to 
appeal States (sic) finding in this matter." This Motion was 
received by the Court on October 10, 1986. The Court reappointed 
Utah Legal Services, Inc., as counsel for the father on October 
16, 1986. 
On October 17, 1986, counsel for the father filed a Motion 
for Extension of Time pursuant to Rule 4(e), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure and a Notice of Appeal. The Court issued a 
Memorandum Decision and Order on October 31, 1986, denying the 
father's Motion for an Extension of Time. The father appealed 
the Court's denial of the Motion for Extension of Time. The State 
of Utah filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on February 24, 1987, 
based on the untimeliness of the appeal. After considering 
briefs on the matter, the Court of Appeals denied the State's 
Motion to Dismiss on May 5, 1987. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A father has a fundamental right to sustain his relationshi] 
with his children. The trial court erred in finding the father 
unfit or incompetent by reason of conduct or condition which was 
seriously detrimental to his children* The trial court denied 
the father his right to due process of law by materially relying 
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upon facts that were not properly admitted into evidence. The 
competent evidence presented at trial clearly preponderates 
against the findings of the court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FATHER HAS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
TO SUSTAIN HIS RELATIONSHIP WltH HIS CHILDREN. 
The relationship between a father and his children is 
protected by both the Utah and United States Constitutions as a 
fundamental right. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); In 
re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1981). This constitutional protec-
tion stems from the recognition that g. parent's inherent right 
and authority to raise his or her own (children is fundamental and 
is deeply rooted in human nature and ijnstinct. In In re J .P., 
the Court found that a termination of (parental rights based 
solely upon the child's best interests violated the parent's 
"substantive right to 'liberty, privaay and family integrity' as 
guaranteed by the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the 
Constitution of Utah." Id., at 1377. ^n individual's right of due 
process would be violated if the State could disunite a family 
for the best interest of the child witjhout first showing that the 
parent was unfit to care for that chilld. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has long recognized that a parent 
has a paramount right to the custody of his or her child regard-
less of whether that child would be better off with a third 
party. Interest of Walter B., 577 P.2d 119 (Utah 1978). The 
Court has spoken of the "prior and fundamental right of a parent 
to rear his child, In re Castillo, 632 P.2d 855, 856 (Utah 1981), 
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and the "policy of the law to support and give strength to the 
family by encouraging the preservation of the parent-child 
relationship and by being reluctant to interfere with or destroy 
it." Robertson v. Hutchinson, 560 P.2d 1110, 1112 (Utah 1977). 
The state can neither remove a child from a parent?s custody nor 
excessively interfere with a parent's education of his or her 
children simply for the purpose of improving their lot. See 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-402 (1923). 
"There is a presumption that it is generally for the best 
interest and welfare of children to be reared under the care of 
their natural parents." State ex rel. Pilling v. Lance, 464 P.2d 
395, 397 (Utah 1970). "The termination of parental rights is a 
drastic measure that should be resorted to only in extreme cases, 
when it is clear that the home is unable or unwilling to correct 
the evils that exist." State in Interest of A.H. v. Mr. and Mrs. 
H., 716 P.2d 284, 287 (Utah 1986), quoting Lance, 464 P.2d at 
397. 
The State can only terminate a parent's rights after provinc 
by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit or has 
abandoned or substantially neglected the child. In re J.P., 648 
P.2d at 1377; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). The Utah 
Code sets forth the permissible grounds for the termination of a 
parent's rights on the basis of unfitness or abandonment. Utah 
Code Ann. §78-3a-48 (1985). See addendum for full text. 
The petition sought termination of the father's parental 
rights based on both unfitness and abandonment. Although the 
trial court made a finding that "the parents behavior indicates 
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abandonment of their parental relationship with these children," 
it concluded that the parental rights should be terminated based 
upon unfitness. Memorandum Decision at 17-21. It is the father's 
position that the court's finding of Unfitness was unsupported by 
the record. The unsubstantiated finding of unfitness and subse-
quent termination of his parental rights deprived the father of 
his fundamental right to sustain a relationship with his chil-
dren. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE FATHER UNFIT 
OR INCOMPETENT BY REASON OF CONDUCT OR CONDITION 
WHICH WAS SERIOUSLY DETRIMENTAL TO HIS CHILDREN 
In order for the trial court to terminate parental rights on 
the grounds of unfitness or incompetence, the court must find 
the existence of either some conduct 6r condition of the parent 
which is seriously detrimental to the children. Utah Code Ann. 
§78-3a-48(l)(a) (1985). To justify termination, the condition of 
the parent "must represent such a substantial departure from the 
norm as to constitute a condition seriously detrimental to the 
children." Interest of Walter B., 577 P.2d at 121, citing State 
in the Interest of Winger, 558 P.2d 1^11, 1316 (Utah 1976). If 
such a condition is not proven, then tj:he statute requires that 
the conduct of the parent must be proven to be seriously detri-
mental to the children. This must be proven by clear and con-
vincing evidence. In re J.P., 648 P.2d at 1377. 
The trial court erred in finding by clear and convincing 
evidence the existence of some conduct or condition which was 
seriously detrimental to the children. The trial court, by its 
own admission, stated that "the court does not believe that 
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parental rights could be terminated based upon the conditions 
alone of these two parents..." Memorandum Decision at 18. The 
court went on to conclude that "the combination of the parents1 
conduct as contributed to and affected by their conditions, is 
seriously detrimental to their children and will continue to be 
so." Memorandum Decision at 19. This finding as it relates to 
the conduct of the father is not supported by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. The trial court erred in finding that the father's 
actions caused the children's emotional problems. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT DENIED THE FATHER DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW BY RELYING UPON FACTS THAT WERE NOT 
PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE 
The trial court erred by relying upon facts that were not 
properly admitted into evidence. The trial court materially 
relied upon the father's alleged participation in a homicide as 
conduct that was seriously detrimental to his children resulting 
in its conclusion that the father was unfit as a parent. Memo-
randum Decision at 13-15. The court apparently took judicial 
notice of this conduct by stating, "The court notes that in fact 
Mr. Yates was sentenced to a term of one to fifteen years in 
prison upon a plea of guilty to 2nd degree homicide." Memoranda 
Decision at 14. 
The trial court erred by taking judicial notice of the 
father's criminal proceedings when certified copies of the court 
files had not been formally placed into evidence at trial. Stat 
in the Interest of Hales, 538 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1975). The Utah 
Supreme Court has directed that "in any case the court should nc 
take notice sua sponte of the proceedings in another case unless 
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the files of the other case are place^ L in evidence in the matter 
before the court." Id. at 1035. The court therefore abused its 
discretion by taking judicial notice pf the father's criminal 
proceedings. 
There was no competent evidence introduced at trial of the 
father!s participation in the homicidb referred to repeatedly in 
the court's Findings of Fact and relied upon materially in the 
Conclusions of Law. There were no withesses with personal knowl-
edge of the homicide who testified about it. The only witness 
who testified at the trial who had fi|rst hand knowledge of the 
events, was the father who pled his Fifth Amendment right against 
self incrimination when asked about the homicide. Record at 501. 
The trial took place on October 23, 24, 25, 1985 and January 13, 
14, 15, 1986. The criminal proceedings took place on February 
11, 1986. Because the Juvenile Court took the matter under 
advisement, its decision was not rendered until August 19, 1986, 
which was after the criminal proceedipgs were completed. Having 
heard of the results of the criminal proceedings, the court took 
judicial notice of the conviction, and materially relied upon it 
without the conviction ever having bein properly introduced into 
evidence. 
The use of facts not introduced into evidence but relied on 
by the court in rendering its judgment constitutes a denial of a 
parent's right to due process of law. Lance, 464 P.2d at 400. 
Like the present case, the Lance courxp took the case under 
advisement at the completion of the ttial, and included in its 
findings were facts that had not occurred at the time of trial. 
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Id. at 401. "It is error for a court to consider any writing or 
anything else that is not in evidence." Id. at 400. By consider-
ing facts that are not in evidence, a parent is denied :he right 
to due process of law since the parent has no opportunity to 
know, cross examine, explain or rebut the evidence. Id. 
By relying on facts not properly introduced into evidence at 
trial, the court denied the father his right to due process of 
law. Because the court took judicial notice of the criminal 
proceedings after the conclusion of the trial, the evidence 
became conclusive against him. Had it been properly introduced, 
the father would have been afforded the right to confront the 
evidence against him and to offer mitigating evidence in his 
defense. 
1. THE TRIAL COURT MATERIALLY RELIED UPON 
THE PLEA IN THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDING 
IN MAKING ITS DECISION 
The trial court materially relied upon the father*s plea in 
the criminal proceedings in the District Court in making its 
decision to terminate the father's parental rights. By its own 
admission, the court had insufficient evidence based upon the 
father's condition alone to make a finding of unfitness. Memoran-
dum Decision at 18. 
It is the father's position that absent the court's 
findings relating to the homicide, there is insufficient evidence 
to support a finding of unfitness based on conduct alone or on 
conduct and condition combined. The court gave a great amount o 
weight to the father's conduct in the homicide evidenced by the 
court's finding, "he (the father) forfeited any possibility of 
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custody when he committed the forementioned homicide". Memorandum 
Decision at 14. The court's reliance on the father's participa-
tion in the homicide was not harmless error. Absent the judicial 
notice of the homicide, the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the findings of the court. 
2. THE COMPETENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
CLEARLY PREPONDERATES AGAINST THE 
FINDINGS OF THE COURT 
Because the father had not lived in the family home since 
March 14, 1984, there was little if amy recent conduct by the 
father adduced at trail that was seriously detrimental to the 
children. By order of the trial courtv the father had been 
restrained from residing with his children for almost two years. 
At trial, the State failed to prove hf clear and convincing 
evidence that the father had ever performed any acts that could 
be construed as seriously detrimental to the minor children 
W.C.Y., D.J.Y and A.Y. The court's decision described a long 
litany of conduct on the part of the children's mother that 
precluded her from adequately parenting the children. Memorandum 
Decision at 11-13. In a previous decision of which the court took 
judicial notice, the court found thatJMr. Yates had engaged in 
inappropriate conduct in 1984, with or^ ly the oldest child, C. Y. 
However, little evidence was adduced at trial that could be 
construed as conduct on the part of tlie father that was seriously 
detrimental to the three youngest children. The testimony 
presented at trial characterized the father as a stabilizing 
influence on his children and showed that the family home envi-
ronment had deteriorated greatly as a result of his absence that 
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was ordered by the court. Record at 304-307, 438-439, 453-454, 
464. 
"[It] is a condition precedent to termination that the 
conduct or condition alleged to be seriously detrimental to the 
child cannot be corrected, after notice and opportunity imple-
mented, by reasonable efforts of assistance." Interest of Walter 
B., 577 P.2d at 124. This condition precedent to termination was 
not met in this case. Jean Williams, the DFS worker assigned to 
the case, testified that the father had substantially complied 
with the Division of Family Services treatment plan signed April 
10, 1985. Record at 150. The father visited with the children at 
every opportunity that DFS allowed him, he underwent therapy as 
recommended with Dr. Robert Strachan, and he remained in contact 
with social workers assigned to the case. Record at 150. He alsc 
succeeded in his pursuit of Social Security disability benefits, 
and therefore had a steady income with which to support the 
children. Record at 376, 470. Because he substantially complied 
with the DFS treatment plan of April, 1985, the father's parenta] 
rights should not have been terminated. 
B. TERMINATION OF THE FATHER'S RIGHTS WAS 
NOT IN THE BEST INTEREST OF ALL OF THE CHILDREN. 
The Utah Supreme Court has found that the welfare of the 
child is of paramount consideration. In re J.P. 648 P.2d at 
1377. Because the welfare of the children is of paramount 
consideration, a termination of parental rights should not be 
ordered when it would not be in the best interest of the childre: 
to do so. 
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"The best interest of the child has always been a paramount 
or 'polar star* principle in cases involving termination of 
parental rights, but it has not been the sole criterion." LcL at 
1368. Dr. Robert J. Thomas, a psychologist who performed psycho-
logical evaluations on the children, testified that W.C.Y. and 
D.J.Y were attached and bonded to their parents. Record at 
208-210. Further, Dr. Thomas testified that given the bonding of 
W.C.Y. and D.J.Y. to their parents, it would be "guite traumatic" 
for them to be permanently and involuntarily removed from their 
parents. Record at 209-210. When asked whether termination of 
his parental rights would be more damaging to W.C.Y. than long 
terra foster care, Dr. Thomas responded that, "depending on the 
consistency and stability of foster c&re, no, I don't think it 
(long term foster care), in terms of trade-offs, would be any 
more damaging, or perhaps as damaging". Record at 217. Because 
it would be more traumatic to W.C.Y. ^nd D.J.Y to have their 
parental rights terminated than to be placed in long term foster 
care, it is not in these children's b$st interests to sever their 
rights to their father. Therefore, the court's decision regard-
ing these two children should be reversed. 
The trial court's conclusion that termination was in the 
best interest of all four children was unsubstantiated. The 
trial court erred in concluding that ftlong-term foster care is 
almost never an acceptable alternative to permanence in a family 
relationship." Memorandum Decision at 
that long term foster care was in the 
20. Substantial evidence 
best interest of W.C.Y. and 
D.J.Y. warrants a reversal of the termination of the father's •4 
- 12 -
rights to these two children. 
The trial court erred in finding the existence of conduct or 
condition on the part of the father that was seriously 
detrimental to the children. It is the father's position that 
even if the court finds some conduct or condition on his part 
that was detrimental to his children, that the conduct or 
condition was not serious enough to warrant termination of his 
parental rights. If anything, substantial evidence adduced at 
trial showed that the termination of the father's parental rights 
would be seriously detrimental to two of the children. The trial 
court also failed to find that reasonable efforts to correct the 
conduct or condition had failed. For these reasons, the decision 
to terminate the father's parental rights to all four children 
should be reversed. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
FATHER'S BEHAVIOR INDICATED THAT HE ABANDONED HIS CHILDREN. 
Abandonment can only result from inaction or a course of 
conduct for which the parent is personally responsible. In re J. 
Children, 664 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1983). As with unfitness, abandon-
ment must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Robertson 
v. Hutchinson, 560 P.2d at 1112. The definition of abandonment 
was set forth in Summers Children v. Wulffenstein, 560 P.2d 331 
(Utah 1977). The court stated the two-part test as follows: 
Abandonment consists of conduct on the part of 
the parent which implies a conscious disregard 
of the obligations owed by a parent to the 
child, leading to the destruction of the 
parent-child relationship. . .the test focuses 
on two questions - has the parent's conduct 
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evidenced a conscious disregard for his 
parental obligations, and has that disregard 
led to the destruction of t}he parent-child 
relationship? 
Id. at 334. 
Neither of the two abandonment prerequisites were present 
in the instance case. The father's alctions, viewed either 
subjectively or objectively, evidenced a firm intention on his 
part to maintain his relationship with his children. He also 
succeeded in obtaining Social Security disability benefits, and 
therefore has a steady income with which he supported the chil-
dren. Record at 376, 470. 
Testimony presented at the termination hearing conclusively 
showed that the parent-child relationship had not been destroyed, 
Dr. Robert J. Thomas, the psychologist who did the psychological 
examination on three of the children, testified that W.C.Y. and 
D.J.Y. were closely bonded to their father. Record at 217. Jean 
Williams testified that the children still ask about their fathei 
when she sees them. Record at 149. 
Because the court ordered him tol leave the home in March, 
1984, the father's conduct should be judged according to the 
non-custodial parent standard for abaindonment. When the facts oi 
the present case are examined in light of prior Utah Supreme 
Court cases concerning non-custodial parents in which the Court 
has concluded that there was an abandonment, it becomes even more 
clear that the father's behavior does not indicate that he 
abandoned his children. In Summers Children, the Court based its 
conclusion that the father of two girls had abandoned them on the 
following four findings: (a) he had i^ot provided financial 
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support for them; (b) he had little or no contact with them since 
their birth; (c) he had not manifested any intention to resume 
custody of them; (d) his present whereabouts were unknown. 560 
P.2d at 332. In In re J. Children, the Court based its conclu-
sion of abandonment on the fact that the mother had shown no 
interest in the welfare of the children during the more than 
three and one-half years when the father had custody, and its 
finding that a parent-child relationship did not exist. 664 P.2d 
at 1161. Finally, in Matter of Adoption of Guzman, the court 
based its conclusion of abandonment on the fact that during a 
period of about four years the mother of the children showed 
little interest in them, failed to exercise her rights of visita-
tion, and failed to communicate or to attempt to communicate with 
them or their father. 586 P.2d 418 (Utah 1978). 
The facts of the present case are very different than the 
facts of the cases cited above. Unlike any of those three cases, 
the father has visited the children at every opportunity and he 
has substantially complied with the treatment plan prescribed by 
Division of Family Services. He used funds from his minimal 
welfare grant for one person to purchcise clothing and other item; 
that the children needed before spending money on himself. Recor< 
at 47. At the time of trial, he had secured Social Security 
disability dependent's benefits in his effort to continue sup-
porting his children. Testimony at trial showed that the childre 
were bonded to their father. The second prong of the abandonment 
test had not been met because the father's actions did not lead 
to a destruction of the parent-child relationship. Since neithc 
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in making its decision. The 
of the prongs of the abandonment test have been met, the court's 
finding of abandonment should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion by taking judicial 
notice of proceedings in another court that had not been formally 
introduced into evidence at trial. Tjie court materially relied 
upon the findings of the other court 
father was denied his right to due process of law because the 
judge took judicial notice of the other proceeding after the 
conclusion of the trial, denying the father the opportunity to 
rebut the evidence or to show mitigating circumstances. The 
competent evidence presented at trial clearly preponderates 
against the findings of the court. Bfecause the findings are 
clearly erroneous, the decision of the trial court to terminate T 
the father's parental rights should be reversed. 
DATED this /v day of 1988 
UTAH LE$AL SERVICES, INC. 
)r Appellant 
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78-3a-48. Termination of parental rights — Grounds — 
Hearing — Effect of order — Placement of child 
— Voluntary petition of parent J 
(1) The court may decree a termination of all parental rights with respect to 
one or both parents if the court finds either (a), (b), (c), or (d) as follows: 
(a) that the parent or parents are unfit or incompetent by reason of 
conduct or condition which is seriously detrimental to the child; 
(b) that the parent or parents have abandoned ihe child. It is prima 
facie evidence of abandonment that the parent or parents, although hav-
ing legal custody of the child, have surrendered physical custody of the 
child, and for a period of six months following th^ surrender have not 
manifested to the child or to the person having the physical custody of the 
child a firm intention to resume physical custody!or to make arrange-
ments for the care of the child; 
(c) that after a period of trial, during which the child wras left in his 
own home under protective supervision or probation, or during which the 
child was returned to live in his own home, the pare tit or parents substan-
tially and continuously or repeatedly refused or failed to give the child 
proper parental care and protection; or 
(d) has failed to communicate via mail, telephony, or otherwise for one 
year with the child or shown the normal interest! of a natural parent, 
without just cause. 
(2) A termination of parental rights may be ordered only after a hearing is 
held specifically on the question of terminating the rights of the parent or 
parents. A verbatim record of the proceedings must be taken and the parties 
must be advised of their right to counsel. No hearing ma^ be held earlier than 
ten days after service of summons is completed inside 6r outside of the state. 
The summons must contain a statement to the effect ihat the rights of the 
parent or parents are proposed to be permanently terminated in the proceed-
ings. The statement may be made in the summons originally issued in the 
proceeding or in a separate summons subsequently issued. 
(3) Unless there is an appeal from the order terminatijng the rights of one or 
both parents, the order permanently terminates the legal parent-child rela-
tionship and all the rights and duties, including residual parental rights and 
duties, of the parent or parents involved. 
(4) Upon the entry of an order terminating the rights of the parent or 
parents, the court may (a) place the child in the legal custody and guardian-
ship of a child placement agency or the department of public welfare for 
purposes of adoption, or (b) make any other disposition df the child authorized 
under § 78-3a-39. All adoptable children shall be placed for adoption. 
(5) The parent-child relationship may be terminated upon voluntary peti-
tion of one or both parents if the court finds that the terijnination is in the best 
interests of the parent and the child. This termination with respect to one 
parent does not affect the rights of the other parent. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 47, formerly C. of parental rights ubon a finding of best inter-
1953, 55-10-109 redes, as 78-3a-48; L. 1980, ests of the child without requiring a finding of 
ch. 40, § 1; 1981, ch. 157, § 1; 1985, ch. 199, parental unfitness, abandonment, or substan-
§ *• tial neglect was unconstitutional on its face 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-
 s i n c e i t violated a parent's rights to his child 
ment substituted "a termination" for "an invol-
 u n d e r U t a h Const.J Art. I. Sees. 7 and 25 and 
untary termination in Subsection (1); rewrote
 t h e n i m h a n d f o u r t e e n t h a m e ndments of the 
Subsection (lXa), which formerly read as
 f e d e r a J C o n s t i t u t i o J . t h a t t h e 1 9 8 1 amendment 
amended by Laws 1981, chapter 157, § 1; de- . ., • .. , 1 , , ,, , .. 
leted Subsections (IXaXi) through J° * « S e C t l 0 n ' ^™1? t ^ ^ 7 
(lHaXviiiXC), which formerly read as amended f°r d e t e ™ n S the child s best interest under 
by Laws 1981, chapter 157, § 1; added Subsec- t h e s t a n d a r d established oy the 1980 amend-
tion (Did); substituted "may" for "shall" in the m e n t ' d o e s n o t r e m a l n i n e f ! e c t a f t e r t h e i n v a l i ' 
third sentence of Subsection (2); and made d a t l o n o f t h e 1 9 8 0 amendment; and that this 
minor changes in phraseology. section, as enacted in 1965, is not repealed, but 
the same extent as if the Compiler's Notes. — The Supreme Court of remains in force to 
Ftah, in In re J. P. (1982) 648 P.2d 1364, held: portio 
lat the 1980 amendment to this section, valida 
which permitted the involuntary termination acted. 
Uta ns of the 1980 and 1981 amendments in-
th ted by the opinion had never been en-
ADDENDUM 1 - 1 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of 
YATES, Cherilee (06-28-73) 
YATES, William (11-01-76) 
YATES, Joseph (10-07-78) 
YATES, Amanda (09-12-81) 
Persons under eighteen years of age 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
INCLUDING FINDINGS 
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 347651-52 
357333-356332 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for trial on 
October 23, 24, 25, 1985, and January 13, 14, 15, 1986, on a petition 
filed August 14, 1985 seeking tenaination of parental rights. Present 
at all hearings were the mother; Dennis Olsen, Esq.,, attorney for the 
mother; father; Louisa Baker, Esq., Utah Legal Services attorney for 
the father; Olof Johansson, Esq., Deputy County Attorney; David 
Littlefield, Esq., Guardian ad litem; Ann Wasserman, Esq., Guardian ad 
litem, and other parties as witnesses. The State Division of Family 
Services, which has guardianship of the above-named children, was 
present through its authorized representatives, Jean Williams, and/or 
Virginia Rees. The Court heard testimony from 25 witnesses and 
reviewed 16 exhibits which were entered into evidence, and being fully 
informed in the premises, hereby enters the following Memorandum 
Decision, including Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1• The above-named children have been previously adjudicated as 
neglected through other judicial proceedings. This Court entered an 
order on January 28, 1985, finding that the above-named children were 
neglected and placing the children in the custody and guardianship of 
the Division of Family Services. Specifically, the Court found that 
Cherilee Yates had been subjected to acts of sexual abuse, including 
vaginal fondling by her father, William G. Yates. 
ADDENDUM 2-1 
The Court further found that Cherille Yates had in the past been 
sexually abused by her grandfather, who was subsequently allowed in 
the home for an extended period of time by the parents. The Court 
also found that the parents continued to deny any sexual abuse of 
Cherilee and that such denial demonstrated their lack of understanding 
of the conditions and needs of their children, presenting a danger of 
future and continued abuse. The Court further found that all of the 
children suffered from significant emotional problems attributable to 
the lack of emotional stability and parenting ability of the parents. 
In the order of January 28, 1985, the Court also found that the 
children had been previously placed outside the home due to lack of 
proper care by the parents, emotional instability of the parents, and 
marital discord between the parents. Said problems continued to exist 
within the home, placing the children at risk for further neglect, 
abuse, or lack of stimulation and nurturence. The Court also 
specifically found that "both parents suffer from emotional problems 
which render them presently incapable of properly caring for the 
above-named children. Both parents exhibit a lack of understanding of 
their children's problems, particularly Cherilee's condition and their 
role in creating said conditon. Because of said lack of understanding, 
both parents are unable to properly care for the children." The Court 
had previously entered a restraining order against the father 
restricting his access to the children, prohibiting any contact with 
Cherilee and Amanda, and allowing only supervised visits with the 
boys. However, the children were, at the time of the January 28, 
1985, order in the physical custody and residing with the mother. The 
Court directed the Division of Family Services to prepare treatment 
plans outlining the responsibilities of the parents in resolving the 
problems which the Court had found and to enable them to eventually 
regain custody of their children. 
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2. The parents have failed or refused to acknowledge this Court's 
previous findings and have made little effort to correct the situation 
causing the Court's orglnial findings of neglect. The father, William 
Gerald Yates, has never acknowledged the sexual abuse of Cherilee, and 
has continued to deny that such abuse ever occured through the entire 
course of the orginial trial on neglect and througout the ensuing year 
of "treatment11, and continuing through the trial on the present 
petition. He has never dealt with the subject of the sexual abuse of 
Cherilee in any way in therapy, except to continue his denial. His 
attention, and his efforts to direct the Court's attention, was always 
on Cherilee's "lying" and general promiscuous behavior, and never 
accepted or acknowledged any fault or wrongdoing, despite the Court's 
findings by clear and convincing evidence that the sexual abuse did 
occur. 
The mother, Mary Ellen Yates, also consistently denied that there 
had every been sexual abuse of Cherilee by either the father or the 
grandfather, despite Court findings that both men had in fact sexually 
abused Cherilee. The mother also consistently maintained that her now 
thirteen, but then eleven, year old daughter was lying, despite expert 
testimony to the contrary. The parents' continued denial of the 
sexual abuse of Cherilee has resulted in a total rejection of Cherille 
by both parents. Cherilee continues to be treated in the Utah State 
Hospital for a severe mental illness contributed to, in significant 
part, by the sexual abuse and lack of acknowledgement by the parents. 
Neither parent acknowledges lifestyle problems which have been 
chronic and have had seriously adverse effects on their children. 
There is a long history of ongoing marital problems resulting in at 
least one extended voluntary placement of the children in foster care, 
several extra-marital affairs, and two of the four children being 
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fathered by men other than Mr, Yates, to whom the mother was legally 
married at all times. Because of the ongoing martial problems and 
significant emotional instability of both parents, the children have 
been in and out of foster care for many years for various periods of 
time. More recently, the children have been subjected to displays of 
sexual activity by the mother, including her acknowledged affair with 
a seventeen year old boy, the constant presence of others in their 
household, including relatives, friends, and various men, causing 
constant disruption in their lifestyles. There has also been a 
chronic display by both parents of a lack of .empathy for the needs of 
their children. These problems have never been acknowledged nor 
changed by the parents. Their continual denial of any of these 
problems demonstrates their instability and inadequacies as parents. 
It should be noted that both parents did acknowledge that two of the 
children were not fathered by Mr. Yates, and Mr. Yates acknowledged 
the ongoing marital problems including his wife's affairs. However, 
only their own personal issues with regard to any of these problems 
were ever dealt with by either parent in therapy; neither ever dealt 
with the effects of all of these problems upon their children. 
3. Rehabilitative efforts by the Division of Family Services to 
assist the parents have been futile and the parents have failed or 
refused to participate In treatment plans speclflcalv designed to aid 
them in altering the orginial problems of neglect and regaining 
custody of their children. The parents have made littlef if any, 
change in their lifestyle and the prognosis for change in their 
conduct or conditions is poor. 
It was the Court's orginial intention following the trial on the 
neglect petition that the children should remain in the physical 
custody of their mother and that both parents should engage in 
treatment plans designed to assist them with their personal and 
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marital problems and also in their parenting skills and abilities. 
However, prior to the actual implementation of originial treatment 
plans which would have allowed the children to remain in the home of 
the mother, it became necessary for the Division of Family Services to 
remove the children from the mother's home and place them in foster 
care. Several events precipitated such placement, which were detailed 
through the testimony of Jean Williams, the Division of Family 
Services foster care worker. Such events included several reports of 
the children attending school in an unkempt and uncared for condition, 
that their clothing was inadequate, and that the mother was not 
keeping the home in an adequately clean condition. It was also 
reported and verified that the mother had initiated a sexual 
relatinship with a seventeen year old boy who was present in the 
household with the children and accompanied the mother on at least one 
occasion to visit Cherilee in the State Hospital and was present in 
the household with the mother when Cherilee came home on a home 
visit. All of the problems combined to cause serious concern for the 
safety and well being of the children, and they were placed in foster 
care on February 28, 1985, and have remained in substitute care since 
that date. 
Treatment plans were entered into and ordered by the Court 
following the placement of the children in foster care. The mother 
signed and agreed to a treatment plan dated March 12, 1985, which was 
prefaced by a paragraph clearly stating that the mother understood 
that failure to accomplish the responsibilities of the treatment plan 
would result in the filing of a petition for permanent deprivation of 
her parental rights. The treatment plan outlined the following 
responsibilities of the mother: 
A) Therapy. The mother was to meet twice monthly in individual 
therapy and participate in weekly group therapy in the parents group 
at the Utah State Hospital. She was also to register for and attend at 
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least 8 out of 10 parenting classes at the Family Support Center. 
B) At the end of ninety days from the date of the treatment plan, 
the mother was to undergo a psychological re-evaluation to assess 
changes in her emotional condition. 
C) The mother was to obtain and maintain employment to provide 
herself with economic self-sufficiency. 
D) The mother was to maintain a written budget of income and 
expenses to enable review of economic self-sufficiency. 
E) Regarding visits with the children, no visits were to be 
allowed with Cherilee for a period of one month; thereafter visits 
with Cherilee were to be only under the supervised direction of staff 
at the Utah State Hospital. Visits with Cory, J.D. and Amanda were to 
occur as scheduled by the foster care worker. 
F) The mother was to maintain regular contact with the Division 
of Family Services worker assigned to her case pursuant to the 
directions and schedule provided by said worker. 
The above responsibilities were set forth in writing, and the 
mother signed and agreed to this treatment plan. 
The Court held a review hearing in June, 1985, to determine the 
motherfs progress on the treatment plan. The following progress was 
reported on each of the responsibilities outlined in the treatment 
plan. 
A) With regard to therapy, it was reported that twice monthly 
appointments were kept by the mother until she moved to Price were she 
did contact the local mental health center. The mother missed the 
weekly parent group therapy sessions at the State Hospital 8 times 
between March 12 and June 28, 1985. The mother also failed to 
complete the required parenting classes, attending only 3 out of 9 
sessions. 
B) The mother did complete the required psychological evaluation. 
- 6 -
ADDENDUM 2-6 
C) The mother maintained employment as a seamstress from March 
18, 1985, to June 4, 1985, at which time she left that employment and 
moved to Price, Utah, where she reported that she expected to obtain 
employment. It does not appear that she was ever so employed in Price* 
D) A written budget was provided by the mother. However, the 
budget was inadequate in that it did not contain a food or clothing 
allowance and did not provide for contribution for the care of the 
children. 
E) Regarding the visits with the children, the mother did visit 
on two occasions with Cherilee at the State Hospital, although those 
visits were initiated much later than the required one month in the 
treatment plan. The hospital placed a no visiting order on the mother 
due to her failure to appear for a June 21 visit when she had promised 
to celebrate Cherilee's birthday* Due to the trauma suffered by 
Cherilee at her mother's failure to keep the promised birthday visit, 
the mother's visiting privileges were cut off by the hospital. The 
mother missed scheduled visits with the other children on May 14, June 
11, and June 25. 
F) Initially the mother complied with the requirement that she 
maintain contact with the Division of Family Services worker, but that 
contact became less frequent and finally by late June had ceased 
altogether. There was total non-compliance with the requirement that 
the mother keep the agency advised at all times of her current address 
and phone number, as well as living arrangements. The mother gave 
inconsistant stories about where and with whom she was living, and it 
appears that she moved around several times during this period. 
The mother's progress on the treatment plan was again reported to 
the Court at the trial in October, 1985. Compliance with the specific 
provisions of the treatment plan was as follows: 
A) The mother did attend individual therapy on a fairly regular 
basis, although several scheduled appointments were missed. The 
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mother attended four and missed six therapy sessions at the Utah State 
Hospital. The mother never did complete the required parenting 
classes. 
B) The mother complied with the requirement of psychological 
evaluations. 
C) Regarding employment, the mother represented in Court on June 
28, 1985, that she was beginning a job the next day at a motel in 
Price. She later advised the Division of Family Services that she 
never did work on such job. The mother was employed from July 9, 
1985, to early September at a motel in Salt Lake City, but was not 
employed from early September through the date of the trial. 
D) The mother made infrequent reports as to her income and 
expenses and provided two incomplete budgets to the Division of Family 
Services. 
E) Visits were scheduled for the mother to see the children, 
excluding Cherilee, every three weeks. The mother missed only one of 
the scheduled visits. However, the mother's behavior and interaction 
with the children during the visits exhibits her almost total lack of 
understanding of the needs and emotions of children, and shows her 
preoccupation with her own needs and concerns. 
F) The mother's contact with the Division of'Family Services 
caseworker assigned to her case was sporadic at best. 
The father, William Gerald Yates, also entered into a treatment 
plan, developed pursuant to court order, which outlined his 
responsibilities and the conditions which would allow him to reunite 
with his family and eventually regain custody of his children. That 
treatment plan dated April 8, 1985, included the following 
responsibilities: 
A) The father was to undergo individual therapy as scheduled by 
his therapist. His visits with the children, if any, would be 
contingent upon reports from the therapists that progress had been 
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made through treatment* The father was also to register for and 
attend at least eight out of ten parenting classes at the Family 
Support Center. 
B) To obtain economic self-sufficiency, the father was to utilize 
the resources of the community such as vocational rehabilitation and 
employment security to obtain gainful employment, or he was to pursue 
and obtain medical disability compensation from Social Security. The 
father was also required to maintain a written record of his income 
and his expenditures. 
C) Visits with the children would not occur without Court order. 
D) Mr. Yates was required to maintain contact with the Division 
of Family Servcies by advising them at all times of his current 
address, phone number, and place of employment. He was also to 
contact his assigned worker at the Division of Family Services on at 
least a weekly basis. 
At the June 28, 1985, review hearing, the Division of Family 
Services reported to the Court regarding Mr. Yates compliance with the 
treatment plan. For the most part, in appeared that Mr. Yates was 
attempting to comply with the treatment plan. However, his progress 
was slowed by his continued emotional illness and instability, and the 
on again off again status of his martial relationship with the 
mother. He was extremely preoccupied with his relationship with the 
mother, and reconciliation with the mother seemed to be the paramount 
reason for the father's actions. 
The father's progress on the treatment plan was again reported to 
the Court at the trial in October, 1985. Specifically, the following 
progress was made: 
A) Individual therapy was continued on a twice monthly basis. 
The father was very consistent in attending his therapy sessions. 
However, his progress was not consistent with his attendance, and his 
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emotional state and condition did not significantly improve and in 
fact, prior to the trial in October, 1985, the father was arrested on 
homicide charges relating to the murder of the mother's seventeen 
(then eighteen) year old boyfriend. Due to his arrest, the father was 
unable to attend scheduled parenting classes. 
B) With regard to economic self-sufficiency, the father was able 
to secure a general assistance grant and did continue to pursue Social 
Security benifits. The father did not provide written budget reports 
to the Division of Family Services, but did verbally disclose his 
income and specifically his reliance on his public assistance grant. 
C) The father visited with the boys as scheduled by the Division 
of Family Services. He expressed concern regarding the welfare of the 
boys and Amanda, but never asked for nor expressed concern regarding 
Cherilee. Visits with Cherilee and Amanda were prohibited by the 
Court. 
D) The father did keep the Division of Family Services advised of 
his whereabouts and maintained regular contact with the Division of 
Family Services worker assigned as the foster care supervisor over his 
children. However, he did not maintain weekly contact with his 
assigned caseworker as required. 
While it is clear that the father attempted, to the best of his 
capabilities, to comply with the requirements of the treatment plan, 
his actions demonstrated that his actual progress toward resolving the 
problems which originally brought this family before the Court was 
minimal at best. Although literal compliance with a treatment plan is 
certainly evidence of good intentions, the Court requires that changes 
be made pursuant to the treatment plan, and such changes clearly did 
not occur with the father in this case. 
Throughout the time period covered by the treatment plans, the 
children remained in foster care. The parents were in and out of 
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their martial relationship several times, and the mother maintained 
her relationship with her young boyfriend until he was killed by the 
father in September, 1985. No significant progress was made by either 
parent in resolving the problems which resulted in the originial 
neglect adjudication or in demonstrating any improved capabilities as 
parents. 
4) The mother's conductP aggravated by her emotional condition, 
renders her lncauable of adequatlv parenting the children. The mother 
has had two psychological evaluations and a year of therapy during the 
course of the proceedings in this matter. Her emotional condition has 
remained constant throughout. Specifically, the mother is described 
as an antisocial personality given to manipulation, hostility, 
dishonesty, and irresponsibility, She esternalizes blame and is 
unable to accept responslblity for her actions and tends to place such 
responsibilty (blame) on the children. She is an angry person and has 
little, if any, ability to empathize with others, particularly her 
children. Her personal therapist described her expressed desires to 
have the children returned to her custody as sincere. Both the 
psychologist who did the evaluations and her therapist found her 
resistive to treatment and indicated that she had failed to benefit 
from previous treatment efforts. Throughout her therapy during the 
year of treatment pursuant to this Court's orders, she made little or 
no positive change or progress. Her lack of empathy makes her 
illequipped to parent the children because she has so many personal 
problems and needs of her own which she will meet first and will 
always place her own needs above those of the children. She has her 
own survival skills but is not a productive resource for her 
children. The prognosis for change in the mother's emotional 
condition is poor and the experts testified that she would need three 
to six years of extensive therapy, but that her previous record 
indicates that little if any, cliange will likely occur even given such 
extensive therapy. 
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The mother's emotional condition is revealed in her conduct and 
history of dysfunction* There were many incidents in which the mother 
failed to keep the house in a reasonably clean state. There were 
reports of garbage in the hallways, soiled clothing stacked deeply on 
the floors, and spoiled food in the refrigerator. There is also a 
history of failure to meet the basic needs of the children. School 
officials reported that the children regularly came to school poorly 
groomed, smelling, with poor hygiene, and with dirty clothes. In 
winter weather, the children appeared at school without socks, or in 
socks with holes, with no gloves, and generally improperly dressed for 
the cold weather. The children often missed school, and complained at 
school of being hungry or improperly fed. 
The mother's conduct throughout her marriage also indicated her 
consistency in placing her own pleasures before the needs of her 
family, including her children. There was a succession of lovers, 
including two different men who fathered two of her children while she 
was married to the father of the other children, Mr. Yates. At her 
most recent separation from Mr. Yates after the originial proceedings 
in this case, she moved immediately into other relationships with men, 
although legally married, one with a seventeen year old boy who later 
became the father's homicide victim. The mother's romantic 
relationship with this young man dictated her behavior through most of 
the year in which she was involved with this Court. Apparently this 
relationship dictated where the mother lived, whether she attended 
therapy, parenting classes, or visited her children. She changed her 
residence on numerous occasions, following this young man wherever he 
went. Interestingly, some of the testimony indicated that her 
relationship with this young man, though he is now deceased, is still 
the controlling force in the mother's decisions and actions. 
Specifically, even during her last visits with her children, the 
mother referred to the death of this young man, discussed the funeral, 
and indicated that she hoped that the children would visit his grave 
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at the cemetary, this despite the children's repeated dislike of and 
behavior problems relating to this young man. There was also 
indication that the mother's newly found interest in religion related 
to her desire for some kind of religious sanction or seal upon her 
relationship with the young man. 
Following the death of her young lover, the mother described the 
killing in detail to her three youngest children, ignoring their 
affection and concern for their father and the obvious emotional 
damage and upheaval the information would cause. Further, her 
expectation of the children was that they would mourn the death of her 
paramour, that they would attend the funeral, visit the cemetary, and 
generally share and support her grief. Again, this behavior 
demonstrates her total lack of empathy for the needs of her children 
and her selfish seeking to fulfill her own needs. 
Members of the mother's family, as well as her religious leader, 
testified as to recent changes in the mother's conduct and condition. 
However, despite regular and constant efforts by the Court and the 
State of Utah to effect any change in the mother's conduct during the 
preceeding year, none of these changes occured until after the death 
of her lover and the filing of the petition for termination of 
parental rights. Despite the testimony regarding very recent changes, 
there was no evidence that the mother could or would alter the 
long-term inadequacies which prevent her from adequately parenting the 
children. 
5) The father's emotional condition and conduct render him 
incapable of adequately parenting the children. Psychlogically, the 
father is a highly inadequate and emotionally unstable and distraught 
individual. His history reflects severe depressive episodes with 
emotional breakdowns and intermittent hospitalizations. He 
characterized himself as emotionally unfit to take care of the 
children at the present time. He also indicated that he expects to 
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serve prison time of eighteen months to five years and felt that he 
would need additional time beyond that before he would be in a 
emotional condition or position to care for his children. The Court 
notes that in fact Mr. Yates was sentenced to a term of one to fifteen 
years in prison upon a plea of guilty to 2nd degree homicide. 
The father's behavior during the course of this matter shows his 
obsession with his wife and his wife's relationships with other men. 
That obsession is paramount to his love for or ability to care for the 
children. That obsession dictated most of his actions during the year 
that this matter was before the Court, including the eventual murder 
of the wife's lover. Regardless of its effect upon the possibility of 
regaining" custody of his children, Mr. Yates persisted in seeking 
reconciliation with his wife, resulting in constantly fluctuating 
marital status. He sought reconciliation even though he expressed 
hatred, disapproval, and obsessive anger at his wife and his wife's 
lover or lovers. His stated desire to have custody of his children 
was obviously second in importantance to his obsession with his wife's 
behavior and relationships, and he forfeited any possibility of 
custody when he committed the fomentioned homicide. 
The father's criminal conduct has placed him in prison for an 
extended period of time, making him physically incapable of caring for 
the children. The homicide was apparently contemplated in advance and 
in fact discussed with his therapist. Mr. Yates refused to contract 
with the therapist not to use violence toward his wife's lover 
although the therapist attempted such negotiation and contracting on 
several occassions. 
Although Mr. Yates engaged in regular therapy and was hospitalized 
for his emotional illness, he showed little improvement in his 
emotional condition or his ability to control his behavior. Although 
he appeared sincere in his love for the children and his desire to 
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care for them, the full-time task of caring for them would overwhelm 
him, and their needs would quickly become secondary to his own 
emotional and physical needs. Although the father obviously has 
strong emotional feelings for his children, and with the exception of 
Cherilee and to an extent Amanda, the children returned his feelings 
of love and affection, his behavior has been a detriment to the 
well-being of the children, and his emotional condition, coupled with 
his behavior, renders him incapable now or in the foreseeable future 
of parenting the children. 
6) The conduct and condition of the parents have been seriously 
detrimental to the children. All of the children have suffered the 
physical consequences of their parents' neglect and emotional 
instability in that they have had inadequate living conditions, have 
attended school in unclean conditions, and have been physically and 
emotionally abused or neglected. These matters are referred to in 
prior findings. Each of the children suffers from long-term effects 
of their parents' conduct and conditions* 
A) Cherilee. Cherilee has been hospitilized at the Utah State 
Hospital for a substantial period of time since 1984. She has been 
sexually abused by her father and grandfather. She has been diagnosed 
as psychotic and neurologically impaired. She is severely emotionally 
disturbed and has a pervasive developmental disorder. There is 
absolutely no bonding with her parents. The sexuall abuse she 
suffered and her chaotic family situation are seen as the two main 
contributing factors in her episodic progress and her extended stay at 
the State Hospital. She has suffered serious and perhaps irreparable 
damage due to her parents' conduct and condition and failure to 
adequately care for her. She desires to be adopted and not to know 
what happens to her natural parents. Similarly, the parents express 
little concern or desire for a reconciliation with Cherilee. 
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B) Cory, Cory also suffers from serious emotional problems which 
can be related directly to his instable and chaotic home life and the 
lack of appropriate care and nurturance. He has demonstrated 
aggressive behavior and sexual acting out which is a learned behavior 
for a child so young. He is seen as sad and lonely and in need of 
long term therapy. His diagnosis is adjustment disorder with mixed 
emotional features and attention deficit disorder with hyperactivity. 
C) Joseph Daron "J.D." J.D. is seriously disturbed and very 
vulnerable. He is developmentally delayed, unhappy, lonely, feels 
dumb and that he does not belong. He tries to deal with life through 
fantasizing and avoidance. His social-emotional functioning is poor 
and he has difficulty coping. He carries the same diagnosis as Cory 
and is in need of long term therapy. 
D) Amanda. Amanda is the least affected psychologically by her 
home environment and her parents' conduct or condition because she is 
so young and has had little time in the actual care and custody of her 
natural parents. However, experts testified that she too is in need 
of therapy. She is preoccupied with sexual matters, making references 
to "dick and pussy" and "humping" and simulating sexual acts with one 
of her brothers. Amanda is now five years old, and clearly her sexual 
behavior is learned. She also exhibits a lack of proper stimulation, 
language delay, and depression. 
The children are presently in treatment and are receiving 
stimulation and nurturance in their foster care placement. They are 
all seen as adoptable children, but are desperately in need of 
permanence, and are extremely vulnerable to further emotional damage 
due to lack of permanent resolution of their family situation and the 
continued effects of their parents1 problems. 
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7) There is little likelihood of significant change in the 
foreseeable future which would enable the parents to adequately care 
for the children and meet their needs. The parents are presently 
incapable of supplying the physical and emotional care that the 
children need, and there is little likelihood that this situation will 
change in the foreseeable future. Both parents are in need of years 
of personal therapy before they can even begin to learn adequate 
parenting skills. Their conditions will likely continue for such a 
long period of time that if their rights are not terminated, hope for 
adoptive placement of these children is slim. These children are some 
of the most needy, pathetically uncared for children who have ever 
come before this Court, Their need for permanence, and the damage 
already done by these parents, must be considered as paramount to the 
desires of the parents to eventually reunite with the children. 
8) The parents behavior has demonstrated their lack of intent to 
maintain a relationship or resume care of their children. The 
forgoing findings and discussion indicate that the parents* stated 
desire and intention to regain custody of their children is verbal 
only. Although both parents were given opportunities and assistance 
to make changes which would enable them to regain custody, neither 
availed themselves of those opportunities, and in fact no changes were 
made toward regaining custody. 
Despite verbal protestations to the contrary, the parents behavior 
indicates abandonment of their parental relationship with these 
children, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes 
that the evidence is clear and convincing that the parents have 
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demonstrated conduct and conditions which are and have been seriously 
detrimental to their children. Therefore, the Court concludes that 
the parental rights of both parents should be permanently terminated* 
Most termination of parental rights cases which have been reviewed 
by the Utah Supreme Court have focused upon the standard to measure 
either the conduct or the condition of the parent. Few, if any, of 
the cases discuss termination based upon a combination of parental 
conduct and condition. As to condition, the Utah Supreme Court has 
held that to justify termination of parental rights, a condition 
ascribed to a parent must represent such a substantial departure from 
the norm as to be seriously detrimental to the child. If such a 
condition is not shown, then the statute requires that the conduct of 
the parents must be proved to be seriously detrimental to the child. 
There is little case law regarding the standard required for a 
combination of conduct and condition, although the statute clearly 
allows termination based upon such a combination; there does not have 
to be evidence to support termination solely on conduct or solely on 
condition. 
In this case, the Court does not believe thatiparental rights 
could be terminated based upon the conditions aloi^ e of these two 
parents, although both have serious and long-term psychological 
conditions which negatively affect their ability ^o parent these 
children. However, the Court cannot conclude that their conditions 
alone are such a substantial departure from the nc^ rm as to meet the 
standard of State of Utah in the Interest of Wingdrf 558 P.2d 1311 
(1976). However, the Court does conclude that the parents' conditions 
are deeply rooted, long standing, and have been shown to be resistive 
to treatment. Therefore, it is unlikely that the conditions will be 
favorably altered in the foreseeable future to an extent that the 
parents will again be able to provide for the care| and custody of 
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their children. When combined with the conduct which has been 
discussed in detail in the previous findings, the Court does conclude 
that the combination of the parents' conduct as contributed to and 
affected by their conditions, is seriously detrimental to their 
children and will continue to be so. Although each parent 
participated to an extent in the treatment plans required by the State 
of Utah, the purpose of rehabiliative efforts and treatment plans is 
bring about changes which would allow parents to be more capable in 
providing care and nurturance for their children. The parents' 
efforts to comply with the physical requirements of the treatment 
plans in this case clearly did not result in such changes. It is not 
the intent of the law that mere attendance to requirements such as 
counseling, without progress and change being accomplished through 
such attendance, would allow parents to maintain their parental rights 
despite their inability to properly parent and the damage that such 
inability has caused the children. It appears that these individuals 
are not going to become minimally adequate parents, despite the 
State's efforts to assist them, and despite some attendance to the 
requirements of treatment plans. 
The Court is aware of the Supreme Court's Finding in In re J.P.f 
648 P.2d 1364 (Utah, 1981), that parental rights cannot be terminated 
solely in the best interests of the child. The Court held in that 
case that parental rights are fundamental and are strongly protected 
by the constitution. However, the Court also held that those rights 
are not absolute, and may be terminated upon a showing by clear and 
convincing evidence that the parents are unfit, abandoning or 
substantially neglectful. The Supreme Court's opinion goes on to 
state, "the principle that the welfare of the child is the paramount 
consideration" which means that parental rights, though inherent and 
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retained, are not absolute; that the State, as parens patriae, has the 
authority and obligation to assume a parental role after the natural 
parent has been shown to be unfit or dysfunctional; that parental 
prerogatives cannot, at the extreme point, frustrate the State in 
concludes that the 
that these parents are 
discharging its duty." In this case, the Court 
State has show by clear and convincing evidence 
unfit by reason of their combined conditions and conduct, and it is 
unlikely that either will correct or alter their condition or conduct 
in the foreseeable future to an extent that the children may be 
returned to their custody* 
Although the Supreme Court in In re J.P. holiis that the best 
interests of the child cannot be the sole basis for terminating 
parental rights, the Court does state emphatically that a child is 
deserving of a "family." For these children, that relationship would 
be impossible to achieve as long as the parental rights remain 
intact. Neither parent is or will be able to provide a home and 
family environment for these children for years £t best. Meanwhile, 
the children remain in foster care, and their emotional conditions 
continue to worsen, and they remain in need of therapy and counseling, 
although they have been provided with caring foster care. Long-term 
foster care is almost never an acceptable alternative to permanence in 
a family relationship. In the present case, the Court concludes that 
the lack of stability and permanence which would accompany long-term 
foster care would be so seriously damaging to th^ children as to place 
them beyond repair, and certainly beyond adoptability in the future. 
Therefore, although both of these parents did, during the course 
of the proceedings before the Juvenile Court, malfle some efforts at 
literal attendance upon their responsibilities uqder treatment plans, 
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the Court concludes that the standards set forth by law for 
termination of parental rights have been met. At that point, the 
interests of the children become paramount, and it is in the best 
interests of these children that the parental rights of the mother and 
father be terminated and the children be placed in permanent adoptive 
homes• 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the parental 
rights of Mary Ellen Christensen Yates and William Gerald Yates, 
including residual rights, be permanently terminated; that custody and 
guardianship of the above-named children shall continue with the State 
Division of Family Services for placement in suitable adoptive homes* 
Matter is continued for an agency review on the 9th day of October, 
1986 at 9:30 A.M. in the above-entitled Court. 
Dated this 19th day of August, 1986. 
BY THE COURT 
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